Background Copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance, are elements of health-care systems to make prices salient for the insured. Individuals may respond differently to cost sharing, according to the type of care they seek; dental care, as a combination of both acute and elective care, is an ideal setting to study the effects of cost-sharing mechanisms on utilization. Objective To test how coinsurance affects dental-care utilization in a middle-income country context. Methods This study uses policy variations in the Colombian health-care system to analyze changes in dental-care utilization due to different levels of coinsurance. We used matching procedures to balance observed differences in pre-treatment variables between those who face coinsurance (non-policy holders, or beneficiaries) and those who don't (policyholders). We use zero-inflated negative binomial models for the count of visits and twopart models for total expenditures, and test for unobservable confounders with random-effect models and instrumental variables. Results Individuals who face coinsurance are less likely to have any dental-care utilization, at a relatively small scale.
Background
The standard theory of insurance predicts that those insured engage in riskier behavior than those without insurance, hence modifying the risk faced by the insurance provider. This behavior is called moral hazard. As insured patients face a price lower than without insurance, their consumption of health care increases [1] . With health insurance, Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40258-016-0251-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
health-care utilization is higher than its private value, which translates into a net welfare loss.
Cost-sharing mechanisms, such as copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance, are elements of health-care systems to make prices salient for the insured. When members face a price closer to the market price, they reduce their overutilization of health care and the net welfare loss. However, health insurance is also a mechanism of access to health care: plans with high levels of cost sharing reduce access to health care [2] . Current literature has not resolved this debate on the effect of cost sharing on health-care utilization. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment found that a higher level of coinsurance reduces health-care utilization, without a significant negative impact on health status [3, 4] . However, other studies found that increases in cost sharing are associated with decreases in the use of health services of the insured for different types of health services and specialized areas [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
Individuals may respond differently to cost sharing, according to the type of care they seek. Price elasticities are higher for more acute services, and lower for elective visits [13] . Dental care is a combination of both acute and elective health care. Poor dental health can aggravate respiratory conditions [14] , and regular receipt of dental care is an indicator of good diabetes management [15] . Dental esthetic procedures are elective, but nevertheless they have important social implications. Reported dental-related quality of life and self-esteem are lower in individuals with visible malocclusion [16] . Children with esthetic dental anomalies are bullied more than their peers [17] . However, some individuals see dental health as a low priority [18] . Regardless of health status, the guidelines of the Colombian Department of Health (akin to the US Department of Health and Human Services) indicate that any individual should go to the dentist at least twice a year [19] . However, only 40 % of individuals had a preventative dental care visit in the last year [20] . Dental health is then an ideal setting to study the effects of cost-sharing mechanisms on utilization, as it is an important part of overall health status but may not be considered as relevant or urgent as other health services.
The literature on cost sharing and dental care is relatively scarce and mainly focused on US patients [21] . The aforementioned RAND Health Insurance Experiment included dental care in the analysis of the effects of cost sharing. The experiment found decreases in dental-care utilization due to higher coinsurance rates [22, 23] . However, in the short run, dental-care utilization was more responsive to changes in coinsurance than other medical care; after 2 years, responsiveness to coinsurance was not different between dental and other medical care. Other research has shown small effects of cost sharing on dental care in children [24, 25] , and all ages [26] .
In the context of almost universal health insurance, dental-care utilization in Colombia is far below the recommended guidelines, and cost sharing could be a reason for this low utilization. The objective of this study is to estimate how differences in cost sharing, more specifically coinsurance, affect dental-care utilization, in a setting where the design of the health insurance financing mechanisms generates such differences. If higher levels of cost sharing reduce utilization, then it works as a barrier to access. On the contrary, if cost sharing doesn't affect utilization, then it is a viable instrument to generate revenue for the health plan without deterring access. We use enrollment and claims data from a national health plan with a heavy concentration of enrollees in the southwest region of Colombia for 2011-2013. The Colombian health system introduces variation in the levels of cost sharing enrollees face, based on their income and type of affiliation (policyholder vs. beneficiary) to the health plan: beneficiaries face coinsurance while policyholders don't. Since enrollees could take action to select into different types of affiliation, we use statistical methods to control for any biases these actions introduce.
The Colombian Health-Care System 1
The Colombian health-care system is a multiple-payers, two-tiered unique-coverage system with managed competition and almost universal coverage. The first tier (regimen subsidiado, or RS) is means tested and enrollment is free, as the government covers premiums. The second tier (regimen contributivo, or RC) is funded by employer-employee contributions, and premiums are based on the enrollee's income. While plans in this tier are employerprovided, self-employed and informal workers can access those same plans at the same cost. Plan benefits and costsharing mechanisms are decided at the national level, not at the insurer level; from the patient perspective, prices are fixed across insurers and providers. However, the two tiers are administratively separate and have separate regulation. There is competition among Health Management Organizations (Entidad Promotora de Salud, or EPS), who receive a risk-adjusted (by age, gender and geographic location) per-capita payment (Unidad de Pago por Capitación, capitation values) from a national central fund according to the population that chooses to enroll in each EPS. These EPSs organize the delivery of a government-defined package of benefits. There is also competition at the provider level. EPSs contract selectively and providers compete in price and quality to be included in their networks.
Plans in the first tier have a flat cost-sharing mechanism: those in the higher levels of the means-testing instrument pay 10 % of the cost of each procedure, capped yearly at one minimum monthly wage. Plans in the second tier have different levels of cost sharing, according to the enrollee income and their type of enrollment. There are two different types of enrollment: policyholder and beneficiary. The policyholder is the main enrollee to the health plan, and is able to include close family members (beneficiaries) in the policy. Beneficiaries can become policyholders by dropping out of their insurance and obtaining a policy under their own name. Table 1 shows the different levels of cost sharing, according to income (measured in minimum monthly wages, and transformed into US$) and enrollment type. In general, cost sharing is low for basic health care and high for more complex and less frequent care. Patients know beforehand their out-of-pocket costs: providers inform the patient the incurred costs at the moment the patient schedules the visit or the procedure, and patients decide whether to use the services or not. Beneficiaries face higher cost sharing than policyholders: beneficiaries incur in coinsurance between 11 and 23 % of the total cost of the procedures, depending on their income. Out-of-pocket payments are capped by year, regardless of the number of events. All policyholders and beneficiaries incur copayments. If cost sharing affects utilization in the way described according to the moral hazard theory, then beneficiaries should have lower levels of utilization than policyholders, everything else constant. We focus on the difference in cost-sharing levels among policyholders and beneficiaries (both beneficiaries and policyholders face copayments, beneficiaries face coinsurance while policyholders don't) in the second tier to analyze the effects of cost sharing on utilization.
Methods

Data
This study uses enrollment and claims data from a national plan with enrollees in 154 municipalities but with a heavy concentration in the southwest region of Colombia for 2011-2013. Nowadays, it is common to use administrative and claims data from developed countries, but it is still not common to use such data in a developing world context. This health plan has the largest market share in the third largest (by GDP) region in Colombia, but its provider network covers an area larger than its area of influence. Enrollment data contain basic individual demographic characteristics, reported income, and individual capitation values; claims data contain outpatient, inpatient, and pharmaceutical claims.
Statistical Analysis
Ideally, to estimate the causal effect of cost sharing on utilization, one would randomly assign people to different levels of cost sharing and then compute the differences in utilization between both groups. In this observational study, we use as an identification strategy the fact that beneficiaries (the 'treated' population) face higher cost sharing levels than policyholders (the 'control', or comparison population), as the former face coinsurance and the latter don't. As in any observational study, the causal effect sought is confounded by observed and unobserved characteristics that affect both the treatment (the selection into beneficiary or policyholder status) and the outcome of interest. We use matching techniques to remove observed differences in pre-treatment characteristics (sex, age, income, capitation values) between beneficiaries and policyholders. In particular, we apply the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) algorithm [27, 28] . CEM is part of a growing literature that advocates for preprocessing methods in observational studies as a way to overcome model dependence in matching techniques based on propensity scores [29] . CEM is a monotonic imbalance-reducing matching method that assures that adjusting the imbalance on one variable has no effect on the maximum imbalance of any other. CEM meets the congruence principle, and is robust to measurement error [28] . In order to cover the informal sector and workers without a labor contract, the Colombian health system allows individuals to enroll in a health plan as independent workers. These independent workers report their own income and receive the same benefits as formal employees; independent workers can't report income below one minimum monthly wage, even if they earn less. Enrollees can change their policy status from beneficiaries to policyholders: someone can drop off their current policy, and obtain a new policy registering as self-employed. To control for this potential source of selection bias, we exclude from the estimation those policyholders without any beneficiaries in their policy; that is, we exclude from the comparison those who may have decided to become policyholders due to prospective high health utilization and high out-of-pocket expenditures. This selection may include other forms of bias, as we will also exclude single or unmarried enrollees. However, the literature of dental-care utilization shows no differences in utilization by marital status [30] [31] [32] . The final sample includes individuals aged 18-70 who were continuously enrolled in the health plan for the years of the study, and whose policies include beneficiaries.
We use age, sex, income, and capitation values in the CEM algorithm to balance the pre-treatment observed characteristics. Table 2 shows the weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics used in the matching algorithm. Policyholders are older, more likely to be male, report higher incomes and have higher capitation. Note that the sample in 2013 is structurally different than in the previous years: policyholders are younger, and both policyholders and beneficiaries earn less. Moreover, the proportion of beneficiaries is much larger in 2013 than in 2011-2012. We add year fixed effects to the estimation to account for any possible structural changes in the sample over time. Table 2 also shows the comparison of dental-care utilization between policyholders and beneficiaries, with and without CEM weights. The unweighted mean utilization is higher for beneficiaries, but applying the CEM weights reduces this difference.
The number of dental visits and procedures and total allowed expenditures from dental claims data measure dental-care utilization. Even though both measures are linked, the nature of each variable calls for a different model. We model number of visits and procedures as a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. This model separates non-utilization in two different process: one where zero visits follow the same process than any other non-negative number of visits (a true zero), and another where there is an 'excess' of zero visits, not explained by the previous process [33] . For the allowed expenditures, we use the now standard two-part model with Gaussian family and log link to account for zero costs [34] . 2 All models are estimated using maximum likelihood with individual-level clustered standard errors to take into account the correlated nature of the data.
The statistic of interest is the marginal effect, which has different interpretations for each model. In general, a marginal effect denotes the change in the outcome associated with a discrete change in the independent variable. In the zero-inflated model, we compute three marginal effects: the change in the probability of an excess zero, the change in the probability of a true zero, and the overall change in the number of visits and procedures, taking into account excess and true zeros. In the two-part model, we compute one marginal effect: the overall change in allowed expenditures, taking into account no expenditures. The independent variable of interest is policy status: being a beneficiary compared to being a policyholder. Beneficiaries face higher levels of cost sharing through coinsurance, as described in the previous section. We include age, sex, income, primary-care utilization (quintiles of the number of primary care visits, 3 as a proxy of health status) and a year fixed effects as controls. To control for possible lack of access to dental services, we included measures of the number of dental primary care and dental specialty care providers in the patients' municipality (17 % of patients live in a municipality without dental specialty care providers, and no patients live in a municipality without basic dental care providers), and a measure whether the patient lives in a capital city. Table 3 shows the weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model. On average, an individual has one dental visit or procedure, with an average cost of around US$13. Table 4 shows the results of the CEM-weighted zero-inflated negative binomial and the two-part models. 4 Each row is the marginal effect of comparing policyholders and beneficiaries. In the base model, being a beneficiary increases the probability of not having any dental utilization by 1.19 percentage points from excess zeros and 0.83 percentage points from true zeros, for a total of 1.19 ? 0.83 = 2.02 percentage points. The marginal effects of being a beneficiary for the number of visits are negative, but not statistically significant. Due to worries of a structural change in 2013, we estimate the model without data for 2013. With this sample, the estimates of the marginal effects of not having any dental visits are smaller in magnitude: 1.05 and 0.79 percentage points for excess zeros and true zeros, respectively, for a combined increase of 1.05 ? 0.79 = 1.84 percentage points.
Results
The two-part model shows that allowed dental care expenditures of beneficiaries are less than those of policyholders; however, the standard errors are relatively large and none of the marginal effects are statistically significant.
Falsification and Robustness Tests
Even after matching pre-treatment characteristics and excluding policyholders without beneficiaries, there might be unobserved differences between policyholders and beneficiaries, besides cost-sharing levels, that may influence utilization. In such cases, our marginal effects do not reflect the effect of the differences in cost sharing by policy status on utilization, as these associations are confounded by those unobserved differences. These confounding factors should affect utilization through mechanisms other than cost sharing levels. Moreover, these factors should affect utilization without variations in cost sharing. We conduct a falsification test to analyze if there are any unobserved differences in policy status that affect dental-care utilization. In this test, we estimate the base model with different measures of dentalcare utilization: the number of dental visits and total allowed expenditures only subject to copayments. Copayments apply to both policyholders and beneficiaries at the same rate (Table 1) ; for these measures of utilization, there are no differences in the level of cost sharing or coinsurance between policyholders and beneficiaries. In absence of unobserved confounding factors, we should not observe any differences in utilization by policy status for services where policyholders and beneficiaries face copayments only. If we see differences in utilization by policy status for these measures, then we have evidence that there are unobserved differences between policyholders and beneficiaries other than coinsurance that affect utilization. The bottom half of Table 4 shows the results of the falsification test, for the full sample and 2011-2012 only. In all cases, the marginal effects are not statistically significant. We can take advantage of the longitudinal nature of our data to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that may influence the type of affiliation and dentalcare utilization simultaneously by estimating random-effect models. A Conditional Mixed Process estimator [35] allows us to estimate a CEM-weighted random effects ordered probit with three levels of dental-care utilization (no care, 1-3 visits, more than 3 visits), 5 and a CEMweighted random effects two-part model. Table 5 shows the marginal effects of each random effect model. Compared to policyholders, beneficiaries are between 1.36 and 1.64 % more likely to have no dental-care utilization. There is no statistical difference between the marginal effects of the probability of having 1-3 and more than three visits per year. The results of the random effects two-part model are not statistically significant. Despite the smaller marginal effects, our results stand after controlling for time invariant unobserved characteristics of patients. Both results from the falsification tests and the random effect models reinforce the confidence in the ability of our models to estimate the differences in utilization associated with coinsurance.
In contrast to the random effects models, an instrumental variable approach controls for time variant unobserved characteristics that influence both dental-care utilization and type of affiliation. However, instrumental variables models estimate less precise local effects [36] , therefore difficult to compare to other estimates. Keeping in mind the limitation of instrumental variables, and the fact that we are not estimating linear equations, we use a two-step residual inclusion (2SRI) approach to the CEMweighted zero-inflated negative binomial and the two-part models. 2SRI is the equivalent of 2SLS for nonlinear models [37] . The 2SRI approach consists of two steps: first, it estimates the residuals of the estimation of a model with the endogenous treatment as the dependent variable and the exogenous and instrumental variables as controls, and then it includes the residuals in the main nonlinear equations. As instruments, we use job market characteristics (workingage, employed, and underemployed population) at the town level. 6 Hence, following the instrumental variable literature, results from the 2SRI models are the effects of cost sharing on dental health expenditures for those patients whose type of affiliation changed due to local job market conditions. To avoid collinearity with the instruments, we excluded from the model all other measures at the town level. Table 6 shows the estimated marginal effects of the 2SRI models. 7 The first stage of the 2SRI approach is a probit model where type of affiliation is the dependent variable, and the remaining exogenous variables are the independent variables. The relatively large F statistic of the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage of 2SRI indicates that the instruments have good predictive power of type of affiliation, thus they are not weak. Despite the differences in magnitude of the marginal effects, results from 2SRI models are qualitatively similar to the main results: a statistically significant increase in the probability of excess zeros, and no statistical significance effect on the number of dental visits or overall dental-care expenditures. However, the probability of true zeros is no longer statistically significant. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the estimates of the change in dental-care expenditures differ greatly from those in the main results.
Discussion
Differences in coinsurance due to insurance policy status increase the probability of not having any dental-care utilization as expected. Compared to policyholders, who don't face coinsurance, beneficiaries are between one and a half and two percentage points less likely to have no dental-care visits or procedures. However, being a beneficiary didn't change the overall number of dental care visits and procedures, or the expenditures on dental care. One plausible explanation for these results is that coinsurance deters utilization (increase in excess and true zeros), but once individuals use dental care, they do it at a relatively higher expenditure per procedure, such that total expenditures are not different than with lower levels of cost sharing. Therefore, cost sharing works as an initial barrier of access to dental care; once individuals break that barrier, face more expensive procedures. The results from the ordered probit model agree with this analysis: compared to policyholders, beneficiaries are more likely to not have any utilization, but there are no differences in the marginal effects between having 1-3 visits and more than three visits.
Among the three different robustness tests of the main model, the falsification test shows the best arguments in favor of the correct specification of our main models. This test suggests that there are no unobserved characteristics that influence cost sharing (through type of affiliation) and dental-care utilization. The random effects model and the instrumental variables model are limited, as they suggest that there are no time-invariant individual characteristics (in the former) or characteristics of a subset of individuals whose type of affiliation changed due to local job market conditions (in the latter) that bias the estimation. The evidence from the 2SRI is weaker than the evidence from the other robustness tests, as the results from instrumental variable models are driven by a specific group in the analysis; in this case, this group is those whose type of affiliation changed due to changes in the local job market condition. Even though the association between coinsurance and dental-care utilization is statistically significant, it is not clear whether it is clinically or economically significant. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that, if every individual faced the cost sharing level of beneficiaries, the percentage of individuals without dental-care utilization would increase from 73 to 75 %, a relatively small increase. Coinsurance deters access to dental care, although its deterrent effects are small, thus suggesting that, if any, there are other barriers to dental-care utilization more important than cost sharing.
This study has several limitations. First, as an observational study, we cannot claim that we are estimating casual effects. However, we used matching methods to eliminate confounding from observed differences between policyholders and beneficiaries, refined the sample to eliminate possible selection effects into policy status, and conducted a falsification test, a random effects model, and an instrumental variables model to discard the effects of unobserved characteristics associated with utilization though policy status that are unrelated to differences in cost sharing. Second, the sample may not be representative of the enrolled population. In particular, by not including in the estimation those policyholders without beneficiaries in their policy, we may not take into consideration informal workers. And third, this study only analyzes the effect of one measure of cost sharing (coinsurance). Other mechanisms, such as deductibles or copays, may have different effects than the ones estimated here.
Conclusions
This study used policy variations in the Colombian healthcare system to test how coinsurance affects dental-care utilization, a topic for which there is a lack of evidence in Latin America and most of the developing world. While the data are not representative of the country, 80 % of the population covered by the insurer are workers and their families earning less than two minimum wages a month, a population that is in itself of merit to study.
The design of the Colombian health-care system has included different levels of cost-sharing, according to the policy status of individuals. Those who face coinsurance are 2 % less likely to have any dental utilization, but do not have a different number of positive dental utilization or allowed expenses. This effect is relatively small in the overall rate of non-utilization of dental care, suggesting that the cost sharing mechanism does not constitute a substantial barrier to access to dental care. Future research should address other measures of cost sharing (copayments, out-of-pocket caps) or other mechanisms (lack of education, low quality of services) that dissuade patients from dental-care utilization.
